Figure 2. Migration Propensity Index for each state of Mexico, 1999–2006.

Table 6. Results of stepwise regression model predicting the Migration Propensity Index by state, for all years (1999–2006) combined.

Variable	B	Std. Error	Beta	t-score	*P* value
(Constant)	–0.650	1.278		–0.509	0.615
Accidental and violent deaths per males aged 20–34	0.318	0.061	0.499	5.246	0.000
Total fertility rate	0.971	0.271	0.341	3.583	0.001
Percentage of males aged 20–34 who are employed	–0.034	0.011	–0.267	–3.160	0.004
Businesses per males aged 20–34	3.128	1.097	0.250	2.853	0.009
Percentage speaking an indigenous language	–0.010	0.005	–0.164	–2.080	0.048

Dependent variable: Migration Propensity Index.
Adjusted $R^2 = 0.83$.

Table 6 the results for all years combined, and then we proceed to the year-by-year analysis. The pooled data-set represents an unduplicated set of persons apprehended at the border during the entire period from 1999 to 2006. The year of first or most recent apprehension is not incorporated into this model. The dependent variable in Table 6 is the average MPI for all years, as shown in Fig. 2. The predictor variables are the averages of the variables for all years.

Of all the potential predictor variables, five emerge as statistically significant predictors of the average MPI over time, combining to account for an adjusted 83% of the variation in MPI from state to state. The most important predictor is the death rate among males from accidents and

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violence: the higher the death rate, the higher the migration propensity. Obviously, there is unlikely to be any direct connection between death rates and migration in Mexico, but the death rate from accidental and violent causes clearly is indicative of problems in a state that may influence the decision to leave. To understand this better, we conducted a principal components analysis to see which of the variables are grouped statistically with the violent death rate. The results suggest a veritable laundry list of problems associated with states with a higher than average death rate from accidents and violence, including: lower than average percentage of homes with sewer, water and electricity connections, a higher than average illiteracy rate, low wages per firm, low numbers of employees per firm, and low levels of foreign direct investment. This suggests that it is not simply the lack of jobs that push people to move; it is a wider complex of issues, consistent with Massey's concept of cumulative causation.

One of the issues may be that the relationship between violence and migration could be in some way related to the drug trade. There is very little discussion in the academic literature about drug trafficking in Mexico, partly because, as McDonald (2005) pointed out, it is a very dangerous area of research. A UNESCO-sponsored assessment in the late 1990s concluded that '[t]oday, the states of Chihuahua, Guerrero, Durango, Jalisco, Michoacán, Nayarit, Oaxaca, Sinaloa, Sonora and Veracruz, produce 99% of drugs in Mexico' (Astorga, 1999: 15). Of these ten states, seven are among the top ten in terms of violence, with Jalisco, Sonora and Veracruz being the exceptions. A more recent report named Guerrero, Durango, Sinaloa, Michoacán, Baja California, Chihuahua, Nuevo León and Tamaulipas as the Mexican states with the greatest amount of drug trafficking (Mendoza Aguilar, 2007). The border states are obvious choices, but Guerrero, Durango, Sinaloa and Michoacán, as noted above, are among the top ten states in terms of violence, suggesting that there may well be a relationship to drug trafficking.

The importance of Michoacán is underscored by the fact that President Calderón sent 24,000 troops and police into that state in December 2006 in order to battle drug traffickers (Levitch, 2007). To the extent that drug trafficking creates instability at the local level, it is reasonable to suppose that it might encourage people to leave. At the same time, the fact that Michoacán, in particular, has such a long history of sending migrants to the US could increase the probability that drug traffickers would themselves have origins there. However, we have no data to go beyond such speculations, and the relationship with migration, while interesting, could be spurious.

The second most important factor influencing migration is the total fertility rate. As expected, higher birth rates are associated with higher propensities to migrate, and this effect goes beyond the fact that high birth rates are typically associated with lower levels of economic development. It is in line with Kingsley Davis's classical theory of demographic change and response (Davis, 1963), which reminds us that as families grow beyond the size that the parents and local community can sustain, the only reasonable option available to young people is to move elsewhere. In general, those states in Mexico with higher-than-replacement fertility rates are also likely to have higher than average out-migration rates.

The third most important predictor of the MPI is the one that is most often referenced as being important: the employment rate among young adult men. A lower employment rate is associated with a higher propensity to migrate, even independently of the other factors related to low levels of economic development that were indexed by the other variables in the model. This relationship would seem to contradict the idea that undocumented migrants are more likely to come from the dynamic areas of Mexico.

The fourth variable that is statistically significant as a predictor of migration propensity at the state level is the number of businesses per males aged 20–34. This is counter to our expectations and, indeed, at first blush it seems counter-intuitive that this relationship should be positive: that more businesses per male is associated with a higher migration propensity. But, a closer look at the data reveals that there is a negative association between the number of businesses per male and the number of employees per firm. That number, in turn, is associated with higher wages per employee. Thus, the greater number of businesses per male is really a signal that the economy has a larger than average number of small companies paying low wages, and this is reasonably associated with a higher than average propensity to migrate. Related to this is the

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suggestion put forth by Papail (2003) that the remittances from migrants working in the US may be used to create 'micro-companies' that are managed by the migrant's wife, or by the migrant when he returns from the US. These are not businesses, however, that are likely to create jobs for local young adults.

The final variable that is a statistically significant predictor is the percentage of the population aged 5 and older that speaks an indigenous language. This is a negative relationship, indicating that the higher is this percentage, the lower is the migration propensity. This reflects the fact that overall the southern states of Mexico, which is where the indigenous population is concentrated, have only recently begun to participate in the migration flow towards the border.

We obtained a very high, but still less than perfect, R^2 in our model and we examined the residuals for additional clues. There was no sign of spatial dependence or heteroscedasticity in the residuals, but there was one state, Tamaulipas, that has a standardised residual of greater than two. Our model predicted an MPI of only 0.50, whereas the value observed for the state was just above 1.00. Thus, although Tamaulipas does not send a disproportionate share of migrants to the border, it sends more than would be expected, given our set of predictor variables. Tamaulipas shares a border with the southern part of Texas that is heavily Latino and which shares a long history with Mexico, and this probably produces a somewhat different pattern of migration across the border than might exist with other states.

Next, we turn to the year-by-year analysis to see if there if there is temporal consistency in the factors influencing the migration propensity index. The results are shown in the several panels of Table 7. In 1999, for example, three variables emerged as statistically significant predictors of the MPI for that year. These include the gross product per firm (the higher this was, the lower was migration), the death rate from violence and accidents (the higher the rate, the higher the MPI), and the percentage of the population speaking an indigenous language (the higher the percentage, the lower the MPI). Together, these variables accounted for 59% of the variance in the MPI. This is a high percentage, yet it is the lowest R^2 of any year.

The special importance of the death rate from violence and accidents can be seen in the fact that it is the only variable that emerges as statistically significant in all eight years for which we have data. By comparison, the gross product per firm shows up in only two years, and the most recent year was 2000. The percentage of the population speaking an indigenous language shows up four times, but most recently in 2003. Several variables emerge as important in one year, including three variables that are otherwise associated with the death rate from violence: the percentage of the population with homes attached to a sewer or septic tank (the higher this value, the lower the MPI), the percentage of home connected to a water source (the higher this value, the lower the MPI), and the percentage of the population that is illiterate (the higher this value, the higher the MPI).

In the post 9/11 period a pattern can be seen in Table 7 for three variables to be quite consistently associated with the MPI, and all three emerged as significant in the averaged data shown in Table 5. These variables are the death rate from violence, the number of businesses per male, and the total fertility rate. The other recurring variable of importance, the employment rate among males aged 20–34, was also important in the averaged data. Even in 2002, right after 9/11, when migration dropped and when the R^2 dropped from 0.80 in the previous two years to a value of 0.66, the death rate variable and the male employment variable were the significant predictors. Thus, in every year, the factors influencing the propensity to migrate appear to represent a combination of social context and economic context. The political context, indexed by voting patterns, did not emerge as statistically significant.

A shortcoming of the data in Table 7 is that they do not permit us to see the way in which the change in the MPI may be influenced by the characteristics at the place of origin. A straightforward way of examining the trend over time is to calculate the ratio of the MPI in 2006 to the MPI in 1999, using the data shown above in Table 5. This provides an index of the rate of change in the migration propensity over the period of time for which we have data. The calculations are shown in Table 8, rank-ordered by state from highest increase to lowest. The results show very clearly that in the past few years there has been a rapid acceleration of migration out of the southernmost states of Mexico. Chiapas has seen the greatest change, but the top states in this category

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Table 7. Results of stepwise regression model predicting the Migration Propensity Index by state, by year, 1999–2006.

Year	Variables	B	Std. Error	Beta	t-score	*P* value	Adj. R^2
1999	(Constant)	0.504	0.570		0.884	0.385	0.59
	Gross product per firm	0.000	0.000	–0.483	–3.337	0.002	
	Accidental and violent deaths per males aged 20–34	0.278	0.096	0.410	2.884	0.008	
	% speaking an indigenous language	–0.025	0.008	–0.385	–3.009	0.006	
2000	(Constant)	4.342	1.085		4.001	0.001	0.81
	% homes connected to the sewer	–0.033	0.009	–0.680	–3.579	0.002	
	% homes with piped water	0.018	0.006	0.467	2.942	0.007	
	% speaking an indigenous language	–0.023	0.009	–0.365	–2.548	0.018	
	Accidental and violent deaths per males aged 20–34	0.243	0.081	0.346	2.990	0.006	
	Gross product per firm	0.000	0.000	–0.303	–3.016	0.006	
	% males aged 20–34 who are employed	–0.029	0.010	–0.283	–2.892	0.008	
2001	(Constant)	–0.848	1.215		–0.698	0.491	0.80
	Total fertility rate	0.989	0.275	0.391	3.592	0.001	
	Accidental and violent deaths per males aged 20–34	0.238	0.075	0.344	3.181	0.004	
	% males aged 20–34 who are employed	–0.031	0.009	–0.332	–3.476	0.002	
	Businesses per males aged 20–34	3.807	1.312	0.276	2.901	0.008	
	% speaking an indigenous language	–0.014	0.006	–0.239	–2.588	0.016	
2002	(Constant)	2.886	0.985		2.930	0.007	0.66
	Accidental and violent deaths per males aged 20–34	0.372	0.068	0.595	5.442	0.000	
	% males aged 20–34 who are employed	–0.043	0.010	–0.449	–4.108	0.000	
2003	(Constant)	2.969	1.300		2.284	0.032	0.87
	% males aged 20–34 who are employed	–0.059	0.010	–0.458	–5.839	0.000	
	% speaking an indigenous language	–0.026	0.006	–0.435	–4.465	0.000	
	% illiterate among people 20–29	0.092	0.028	0.387	3.239	0.003	
	Accidental and violent deaths per males aged 20–34	0.218	0.050	0.361	4.343	0.000	
	Businesses per males aged 20–34	2.557	0.947	0.207	2.699	0.013	
	Total fertility rate	0.514	0.277	0.181	1.855	0.076	
2004	(Constant)	–4.122	0.662		–6.231	0.000	0.79
	Accidental and violent deaths per males aged 20–34	0.300	0.059	0.501	5.122	0.000	
	Businesses per males aged 20–34	4.901	1.016	0.418	4.824	0.000	
	Total fertility rate	1.120	0.294	0.363	3.814	0.001	
2005	(Constant)	0.155	0.362		0.429	0.671	0.73
	Accidental and violent deaths per males aged 20–34	0.350	0.057	0.620	6.175	0.000	
	% males aged 20–34 who are employed	–0.131	0.031	–0.431	–4.287	0.000	
2006	(Constant)	–4.537	0.659		–6.887	0.000	0.81
	Accidental and violent deaths per males aged 20–34	0.302	0.053	0.506	5.725	0.000	
	Businesses per males aged 20–34	5.106	0.927	0.450	5.509	0.000	
	Total fertility rate	1.298	0.296	0.379	4.383	0.000	

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Table 8. Ratio of MPI in 2006 to the MPI in 1999 as a measure of change over time, by state.

State	MPI in 2006/MPI in 1999
Chiapas	2.22
Campeche	2.11
Tabasco	1.77
Tlaxcala	1.76
Quintana Roo	1.75
Yucatan	1.50
Puebla	1.33
Mexico	1.23
Guerrero	1.21
Veracruz–Llave	1.21
Coahuila de Zaragoza	1.12
Baja California	1.10
Oaxaca	1.09
Michoacan de Ocampo	1.08
Distrito Federal	1.07
Hidalgo	1.05
Guanajuato	1.04
Sinaloa	0.98
Queretaro Arteaga	0.97
Morelos	0.94
Nayarit	0.93
Jalisco	0.93
Colima	0.77
Sonora	0.73
Zacatecas	0.71
Aguascalientes	0.71
San Luis Potosi	0.71
Durango	0.69
Tamaulipas	0.55
Chihuahua	0.52
Nuevo Leon	0.52

include every one of the states that is most distant from the US–Mexico border. This can be seen graphically in Fig. 3. The entire area south of Mexico City now has a building momentum of migration to the border.

In Table 9 we use the same set of predictor variables averaged over all years that was used in Table 6, in order to predict the ratio of the MPI in 2006 to the MPI in 1999. The results show a good fit with an adjusted R^2 of 0.55, and two variables emerged as statistically significant. The first is the percentage of homes connected to water (the lower this percentage, the more rapidly has the MPI increased over time). Keep in mind that this variable is highly intercorrelated with the percentage of homes that have electricity and that are connected to a sewer system, and so it is an overall indicator of infrastructure and the standard of living. The other statistically significant variable is the death rate from violence, but in this case it is working in the opposite direction: the lower the death rate from violence, the more rapidly did the MPI increase over time. This seems to suggest that the states in which the MPI is increasing are especially those in which the living conditions are below average, but they are less likely than in the past to be the states plagued by higher than average deaths among young men from violent causes. In the bivariate correlations with the change in MPI, the variables of percentage speaking an indigenous language and the percentage illiterate emerged as highly significant correlates, but their high correlations with the piped water variable left them out of the final regression model. The implication is that the 'new' migrants from Mexico to the border are increasingly persons of indigenous origin from the south of Mexico. This is consistent with the recent work of Cornelius and his associates, as noted earlier.

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION

In this paper we have used unduplicated counts of persons detained by the US Border Patrol as a way of estimating who has been crossing the border from different states of Mexico into the US. Our data suggest that there has been a noticeable shift away from the 'historic' states and the border states, and towards a larger absolute volume of migrants from the Mexico City metropolitan area, and from the states to the south of Mexico City. Thus, there appears to have been a noticeable shift in the geographical origins of migrants from Mexico in absolute terms, rather than maintaining the historical pattern. This is consistent with data that Cornelius and his associates have deduced from their research in Mexico, and the pattern has also been observed by Mexican demographers (Anguiano Tellez, 2003).

The comprehensiveness of the Border Patrol database allowed us to go beyond the absolute number of migrants per state, and to couple those data with demographic data from each state to calculate the propensity of people aged 20–34 in each state to migrate to the border. Since Estado de Mexico, for example, is a populous state, we would expect a large number of migrants to be from that state if all other things were equal.

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

Figure 3. Change in Migration Propensity Index for each state of Mexico from 1999–2006.

Table 9. Results of stepwise regression model predicting the ratio of the Migration Propensity Index in 2006 to the MPI in 1999, by state.

Variable	B	Std. Error	Beta	t–score	*P* value
(Constant)	2.008	0.625		3.216	0.003
% homes with piped water	–0.028	0.005	–1.103	–5.482	0.000
Accidental and violent deaths per males aged 20–34	–0.148	0.062	–0.318	–2.239	0.024
% homes connected to the sewer	0.018	0.008	0.464	2.251	0.033

Dependent variable: Migration Propensity Index.
Adjusted $R^2 = 0.55$.

Michoacán, on the other hand, is only the tenth-ranked state in terms of its population aged 20–34, and so its persistence as the leader in sending migrants suggests that people are leaving that state in disproportionate numbers. One explanation is clearly that historically it was, for a variety of reasons that may no longer matter, an early source of migrants and, following the models of network theory and cumulative causation, it has remained that way. Our Migration Propensity Index showed that there were a number of states, including Michoacán and the other states highlighted by the MMP, that have been sending more migrants than would be expected on the basis of how many young adults they have.

The National Population Council of Mexico (CONAPO) has created its own index of migration 'intensity' for each state of Mexico, based on data collected in the sample portion of the 2000 Mexican census regarding family members who

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have migrated. The comparison with our data, collected by the US government directly from would-be migrants, is instructive. The CONAPO study calculated the proportion of households in each state that: (a) received remittances from a family member residing in the US; (b) had at least one household member who migrated to the US during the five years prior to the census and were still there at the time of the 2000 census; (c) had at least one household member who migrated to the US during the five years prior to the census and returned home to Mexico during that same time period; and (d) had at least one household member who had lived in the US in 1995, but had returned to Mexico by the time of the 2000 census. These four variables were highly intercorrelated and so a principal components analysis was conducted to reduce them to a single score, which they called the Index of Migration Intensity.

The Pearson correlation coefficient between our Migration Propensity Index averaged over the entire 1999–2006 period and the CONAPO Index of Migration Intensity was 0.76, suggesting that the state patterns we are observing are robust. An even better indication of the robustness is that the correlation is highest between the CONAPO index (which is based on the 2000 census) and our index based on 2000 detainees: 0.81. The coefficients drop monotonically over time, and the lowest correlation was with our 2006 detainee data (0.63), which is indicative of the changing nature of the migration flow from Mexico to the US. One of those changes, of course, is the fact that migrants are less likely to return to Mexico than in the past, and two of the four variables in the CONAPO index relate to return migration. If we look only at the percentage of households who sent a migrant to the US during the five years prior to the census, the correlation with our index is even higher: 0.81 overall, and 0.85 for the year 2000, with no outliers among the states.

In examining the state-level factors that were most associated with our Migration Propensity Index, we found that the most consistent predictor among those state-level variables available to us was the death rate from violence and accidents among men aged 20–34. The states with a higher propensity to violence also have a higher propensity for migration, although as we noted this is beginning to change. This is related statistically to several indicators of lower than average economic development. Not surprisingly, given the high correlation between our index and that of CONAPO, the latter's index of migration intensity was also most powerfully explained by the death rate from violence and accidents among men aged 20–34.

Our analysis of the state-level factors associated with the migration propensity index suggests the importance of the combination of demography and political economy. Lower levels of economic development and all of the problems that are associated with it are factors that contribute to migration, while high fertility plays a role in encouraging migration, probably because it creates a situation of too many young people chasing after too few local jobs. Although demographers are well aware of the push created by a redundant young population produced by high birth rates, this factor has not lately been at the centre of attention of migration analyses, so its emergence here as an important predictor is significant. At the same time, a lower than average employment rate among young men, even when taking the fertility effect into account, along with a generally unfavourable economic environment in a state, are also statistically significant predictors of migration to the border. All of these factors suggest that people are leaving places where the situation is relatively bad, rather than migrating from places where the situation is better than average.

Particularly noteworthy is the finding that the most rapid increase in the propensity to migrate is occurring in those southern states of Mexico dominated demographically by indigenous populations, and experiencing lower levels of infrastructure improvement than other states in Mexico. The state of Oaxaca seems to be leading edge of this wedge. Although the roots of migration from Oaxaca to the US go back at least to the 1930s, household surveys from Oaxaca suggest that there was a clear upsurge in the 1990s (Cohen, 2005). These southern states do not yet command the migration stream, but they represent an increasing fraction of all migrants. In the US, the impact on local communities is that migrants may soon be less well educated, and less literate even in Spanish, than earlier migrants, reversing a trend towards gradually higher educational levels among migrants (see Marcelli and Cornelius, 2001), and thus potentially complicating local efforts to cope with their arrival. The

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evidence thus far suggests that indigenous Mexican migrants are most likely to seek jobs either in the service industry of the Los Angeles metropolitan area, or in the agricultural sector of California's Central Valley, but there is anecdotal evidence of indigenous-language groups in Illinois, New York and Florida (Fox and Rivera-Salgado, 2004). It has been suggested that this process 'will require rethinking Mexican migration in terms of the diversity of different ethnic, gender, and regional experiences . . . this recognition of diversity is crucial for broadening and deepening coalitions with social actors, both in the United States and in Mexico' (Fox and Rivera-Salgado, 2004: 45–6).

Until recently, the indigenous population had moved mainly within Mexico, especially towards urban areas, rather than undertaking the trek across the US–Mexico border. Within Mexico, the trend towards a movement of people out of the south toward the US could potentially create labour shortages in a part of the country that paradoxically already relies in part on immigrant labour (including undocumented immigrants) from Guatemala.

A major limitation of the data we have relied upon in this research is that the only information we have about the individual migrants is their age, sex, and place of birth. Thus, our inferences about the factors that might have prompted their own migration are based on state-level aggregations, and we do not wish to fall into the potential trap of an ecological fallacy. However, we can conclude that states that send disproportionate shares of migrants tend to be those with below average social and economic infrastructures. This is especially true of the states from which we see the most rapid recent increase in the propensity to send migrants to the US. The relevance of the state-of-birth data also depends upon the extent to which they reflect the place from which migrants actually came. As noted previously, however, the level of interstate migration is quite low in Mexico, so we do not believe that this is an issue.

Overall, the origins of migrants detained by the US Border Patrol offer a picture of significant changes taking place that will have potentially far-reaching effects in both Mexico and the US. New areas of Mexico are being opened up to the diffusion of wealth and ideas spreading from migrants back to their places of origin in Mexico. At the same time, the task of integrating immigrants from new places in Mexico puts a burden on communities in the US, in which Mexican migrants from different places, with different Spanish and English abilities, and potentially different cultural values, must negotiate life together (since they tend to be lumped together by people living in the communities to which they migrate), and together they must negotiate life in the US. The persons attempting to cross the border without documentation are almost all young adults, and a large number of them will wind up having children who are born in the US who will automatically be US citizens. These are the 'anchor babies' who, when they reach the age of 21, can apply for legal status for their parents and other relatives. Indeed, the relatives of US citizens represent the majority of legal migrants to the US which, as we noted in the introduction, is one of the reasons why there is such a demand for workers who are shut out of the legal process.

Although the migration from Mexico to the US has elements of uniqueness, given the physical contiguity of the two nations, other rich low-fertility areas of the world are experiencing similar issues of how to integrate migrants, both legal and undocumented, from 'non-traditional' sending areas. Japan has dealt with this largely by shutting out migrants as best it can. The official government policy is one of maintaining 'ethnic homogeneity' (Castles and Miller, 2003: 164), and the low level of legal migration and naturalisation has tended to create local enclaves of disadvantaged migrant workers.

European nations, by contrast, have been more open to migration, but for most of the post-Second World War period migrants have come from former colonies. More recently, the low fertility and, until 2009, the economic growth throughout Europe, has generated demand beyond these traditional sending regions. In some cases, such as Spain, Italy and Ireland, the nations changed from labour-exporters to labour-importers, with attendant issues of integrating new and culturally different immigrants. Integration is officially an issue only with reference to legal immigrants, however. The European Immigration and Asylum Pact, approved by the European Council in 2008, promotes the deportation of undocumented immigrants from Europe, discourages the 'regularisation' of those who entered the EU without

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papers, and encourages a strong effort to prevent their entry into Europe.

Bledsoe *et al.* (2007: 386), in discussing the plight of undocumented Gambians in Spain, noted that:

> 'most Gambians who come to Spain are unskilled workers whose home country offers far less economic opportunity than Mexico. If, however, the case of African migrants in Spain mirrors that of Mexico/US borderland efforts to restrict immigrant numbers by making entry more difficult, the residence question increasingly hinges more on what is to lose by leaving Spain rather than on what is to gain by coming. The result in Spain, as in the US, may actually be an increase in the size of the immigrant population by lowering the rate of out-migration.'

If this should be the result of the European Union's approach to migration, it will also increase the existence of permanent settlements of undocumented immigrants in Europe, perhaps especially in Spain and Italy, which will create new challenges with respect to integration into society. These challenges will, of course, be layered on top of those that already exist in a Europe that is undergoing a major ethnic transition as a result of immigration (Coleman, 2006; Bundeskanzleramt, 2006).

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